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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In two recent court decisions, the Supreme Courts of 
Florida and Nevada departed from the United States majority 
trend for design defect analyses in product liability.1 In Aubin 
v. Union Carbide Corp.,2 and Ford Motor Company v. Trejo,3 the 
Florida Supreme Court and the Nevada Supreme Court, 
respectively, rejected the use of risk-utility analyses, 
including that endorsed by the Restatement (Third).4 
“[Thirty-five] of the 46 states that recognize strict products 
liability utilize some form of risk-utility analyses in their 
approach to determine whether a product is defectively 
designed.”5   
In deciding Aubin and Trejo, Florida and Nevada 
determined the proper test for product design defects [within 
their states].6 Specifically, the Courts decided whether to 
follow a consumer expectations test, a risk-utility analysis, 
and/or the Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analyses.7 
Aubin involved a product design defect claim for a 
Union Carbide Corp asbestos product found in joint 
compound and texture sprays.8  The Florida Third District 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgement for 
failing to apply the Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility 
                                                 
 
 
1 See Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. 2010). 
2 177 So.3d 489 (Fla. 2015).  
3 402 P.3d 649 (Nev. 2017).  
4 Id; Aubin, 177 So.3d at 493. 
5 See Branham, 701 S.E.2d at 5. 
6 Id; Aubin, 177 So.3d at 493; Larry S. Stewart, Back to the Future: Renewing 
Strict Product Liability in Florida, 90-AUG FLA. B.J. 24, 25 (2016).  
7 Aubin, 177 So.3d at 493.  
8 Id. at 495.  
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analysis.9  The Florida Supreme Court then held that the 
Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis inconsistent with 
the rationale behind strict product liability and reversed the 
Third District Court: “in approaching design defect claims, 
we adhere to the consumer expectations test, as set forth in 
the Second Restatement, and reject the categorical adoption of 
the Third Restatement and its reasonable alternative 
design.”10  
Trejo concerned an alleged product design defect 
found in the roof of the plaintiffs’ Ford  sports-utility 
vehicle.11 In this case, the Nevada Eighth Judicial District 
Court declined to use a risk-utility analysis, noting that 
Nevada has not adopted the Restatement (Third) for design 
defect claims.12 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the 
district court properly used the consumer expectations test13 
as it “[was] not persuaded that the Third Restatement’s risk-
utility analysis provides a superior framework for analyzing 
claims of design defect,” and thus concluded that “design 
defect in Nevada will continue to be governed by the 
consumer-expectation test.”14   
This Note will begin in Part II with a summary 
products liability. This part will focus on the history of design 
defect claims with special attention to the Restatement 
(Second)’s treatment of the consumer expectations test and 
risk-utility analyses, and the Restatement (Third)’s treatment 
of risk-utility analyses. In Part III, this Note will discuss 
                                                 
 
 
9 Id. at 493.  
10 Id. at 510.   
11 Trejo, 402 P.3d at 653. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 657.  
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current doctrinal trends of state supreme courts. In Part IV, 
this Note will discuss the outlier decisions by the Florida 
Supreme Court in Aubin and the Nevada Supreme Court in 
Trejo. Finally, in Part V, this Note will conclude by analyzing 
Florida and Nevada’s recent decision to adopt the consumer 
expectations test as the sole standard, in contrast to the 
majority of states. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
 
“Products liability” refers to liability arising from harm 
caused by products that are sold or leased in the 
marketplace.15 Prior to the 1960s, American products liability 
doctrines failed to hold manufacturers liable for defective 
products.16 Courts primarily relied on two doctrines of 
liability: (1) implied warranty of merchantability, in which 
manufacturers were held liable for product defects even if the 
manufacturer exercised all possible care; and (2) negligence, 
in which manufacturers were held liable for product defects 
if the manufacturer failed to exercise due care.17 At the time, 
both doctrines were constrained by the doctrine of privity, 
which required a plaintiff to prove a direct contractual 
relationship with the manufacturer to recover damages.18  
                                                 
 
 
15 AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 711 (3rd. ed. 2011).  
16 Id.  
17 David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 
963 (2007).  
18 TWERSKI & HENDERSON, TORTS, supra note 15, at 711. 
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In the mid 1900s, the privity limitation began to wither 
away with the introduction of negligence principles.19 For 
example, in 1964, the New York Court of Appeals became the 
first court to adopt modern negligence principles when it 
decided MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.20 In this case, the Court 
rejected the privity limitation, holding that manufacturers are 
liable under a theory of negligence when the product is a 
“thing of nature” and the manufacturer has knowledge that 
the danger may occur to others besides the original 
consumer.21 
Shortly after, American courts began to recognize that 
manufacturers of products containing defects should be liable 
for harm caused by the product regardless of the plaintiffs 
ability to sustain a warranty or negligence action.22 Therefore, 
in 1963, the Supreme Court of California became the first state 
to adopt strict liability in tort in the case Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.”23 The American Law Institute quickly 
followed suit by adopting section 402A as part of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1964.24  
                                                 
 
 
19 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co; 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (NY. 1916); see also 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (holding that the privity requirement 
for warranty is “inimical to the public welfare” and “violative of public 
policy and void.”).  
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
23 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (holding that “implicit in [a product’s] presences 
on the market . . . [is] a representation that it [will] safely do the jobs for 
which it was built.”); TWERSKI & HENDERSON, TORTS, supra note 15, at 774.   
24 See Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, supra note 16, at 963.   
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The adoption of the Restatement (Second) led to the 
introduction of two new tort doctrines.25 The first doctrine – 
the consumer expectations test – evolved from warranty law 
and sought to protect consumer’s expectations generated 
from manufacturers’ representations about its products.26 
The second doctrine – the risk-utility analyses – evolved from 
negligence law and sought to balance the benefits of avoiding 
a risk against the cost of avoiding risks.27 
The Restatement (Second) also reflected three types of 
product defects: (1) manufacturing defects, (2) design defects, 
and (3) defective warnings and instructions.28 Accordingly, 
manufacturing defects occur when a product is not made as 
intended; design defects occur when there is a deficiency in a 
product that is made as intended by the manufacturer; and 
defective warning and instructions defects occur when a lack 
of adequate warning renders a product unreasonably 
dangerous.”29  
Ultimately, in 1988, the American Law Institute 
created the Restatement (Third), which was a total overhaul 
of the Restatement (Second) as it concerns liability of sellers 
and manufacturers of products. Within the Restatement 
(Third)’s four-major chapters, the Institute responded to 
questions that were not part of the American products 
                                                 
 
 
25 1 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products Liability, 
§ 8: 2 (4th ed., 2014). 
26 Id. 
27 Id; 1 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products 
Liability, § 8: 7 (4th ed., 2014). 
28 David G. Owens, The Puzzle of Comment J, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1381-
82 (2004) 
29  AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17:4 (February 2019 update).  
2019 RESURRECTION OF CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST 531 
liability scene 35 years ago.30 Specifically, it adopted the now 
dominant classification of product defects (manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and defective warning instructions) 
and created distinct liability rules for each classification.31 The 
Restatement (Third) also revolutionized the previously 
created risk-utility analyses, incorporating new requirements 
for imposing liability upon manufacturers, including but not 
limited to, a showing of a reasonable alternative design.32 
Similar to the prior Restatement, the concept of strict liability 
reigned supreme in the area of manufacturing defects.33 
However, the Restatement (Third) introduced principles of 
negligence both for products defective in design and those 
with inadequate warnings.34   
In any event, both Restatements have received their 
fair share of optimistic and pessimistic commentaries. While 
it remains unclear whether the longer Restatement (Third) 
will completely displace the more concise Restatement 
(Second), most modern courts have adopted principles found 
in both. Thus, it is important to discuss both Restatements in 
detail to analyze the Supreme Court of Florida’s and the 
Supreme Court of Nevada’s outlier decisions.   
 
A. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) proposes 
that product sellers should be strictly liable for injuries 
                                                 
 
 
30 Id.  
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2; TWERSKI & HENDERSON, 
TORTS, supra note 15, at 742.  
32 TWERSKI & HENDERSON, TORTS, supra note 15, at 742.  
33 Id. at 743; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a.   
34 TWERSKI & HENDERSON, TORTS, supra note 15, at 742. 
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resulting from a product in a “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous” to the user, if the seller is engaged 
in selling said product and the product reaches the user 
without “substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold.”35 These rules apply even if the seller “exercised all 
possible care in the preparation of his product, and the user 
and consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller.”36 Thus, a 
manufacturer or seller can be strictly liable simply by 
introducing a product into the marketplace.37  
 
i. The Consumer Expectations Test  
 
Prior to the implementation of the Restatement 
(Third), courts focused on section 402A’s comments to 
develop the consumer expectations test.38Accordingly, courts 
held that, under the consumer expectations test, a product is 
defective in design “if the plaintiff demonstrates that the 
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably 
foreseeable manner.”39As a result, when a product fails to 
meet the expectations of an ordinary consumer, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the product is defective.40  
Commenters consistently criticize the consumer 
expectations test. While the consumer expectations test is 
                                                 
 
 
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 TWERSKI & HENDERSON, TORTS, supra note 15, at 740. 
39 Id. at 774; Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, supra note 16, at 
963.  
40 TWERSKI & HENDERSON, TORTS, supra note 15, at 774.  
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supposed to be objective – based on the expectations of the 
ordinary reasonable user – the Restatement (Second) lacks 
structure regarding this test, resulting in unpredictable 
results.41 Ultimately, the lack of consensus between courts 
and commentators led many courts to stray from the sole 
application of the consumer expectations test to determine a 
product design defect.42 
 
ii. RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS 
 
As it became clear that one theory of recovery was 
insufficient for product design defect cases, courts began to 
apply section 402A of the restatement as a “risk-utility” 
analysis.43 Under a risk-utility analysis, American courts 
considered factors outlined by John W. Wade, including 
public knowledge of danger, consumers ability to avoid 
danger, and a product’s general usefulness.44 A product is 
thus considered unreasonably dangerous if, after assessing all 
of the factors, a jury determines that the risks of the product’s 
design are greater than the product’s benefits.45  
                                                 
 
 
41 DAVID M. HOLLIDAY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY. 3d §28:44 
(2019).   
42 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 938 (2d. ed. Feb. 2019 update); 
Robert S. Stevens, The Restatement (Third) of Products Liability: Is it a 
Reasonable Alternative Design to Tennessee’s Products Liability Statute?, 39 
U. MEM. L. REV. 463, 473 (2009).  
43 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 938.  
44 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. 
L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).  
45  James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on 
Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 870-71 (1998); Cami 
534 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
While the Restatement (Second) played a fundamental 
role in furthering strict liability principles, it was not long 
before American products liability laws faced complications. 
As time persisted, courts began to apply different definitions 
to the terms found in the Restatement (Second).46 In an effort 
to end countless judicial differences, talk of a new, clearer 
Restatement surfaced.47 
 
B. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)   
 
The Restatement (Third) states that manufacturers of 
defective products are “subject to liability for harm to persons 
or property caused by the defect,” and that a product is 
defective when it contains a manufacturing defect, design 
defect, or is defective due to inadequate warnings or 
instructions.48 Specifically, the Restatement (Third) states that 
a product is defective in design when:  
 
. . . the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design 
by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably 
safe.49 
                                                 
 
 
Perkins, The Increasing Acceptance of The Restatement (Third) Risk Utility 
Analysis in Design Defect Claims, 4 NEV. L.J. 609, 611 (2004). 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. i. 
47 Id.   
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2B.  
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This definition is not exclusive, as a plaintiff can also 
establish that a product is defective in design through 
circumstantial evidence.50 For example, it may be inferred 
that the plaintiff’s harm was a result of a product defect if (1) 
the incident was one that ordinarily occurs due to a product 
defect and (2) the incident was the sole result of a product 
defect occurring during the time of sale or distribution.51 
Further, noncompliance with an applicable government 
statute or regulation will suffice as proof that a product is 
defective in design with respect to the risks the statute or 
regulation seeks to protect.52  
 
i. The Restatement (Third)’s Risk-Utility 
Analysis  
 
Similar to the Restatement (Second), the Restatement 
(Third) adopts risk-utility analyses, but with a controversial 
addition. As previously stated, a product design defect occurs 
when the foreseeable risks of harm from the product could 
have been avoided by implementing an reasonable 
alternative design.53 Under this standard, a plaintiff must 
show not only the mere engineering feasibility or technical 
possibility of an alternative design, but also evidence 
establishing the effect the alternative design would have on 
the product’s safety, utility, and cost.54 Because of the 
                                                 
 
 
50 Id. at § 3.   
51 Id.   
52 Id. at § 4.  
53 Id. at § 2.  
54 1 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products Liability, 
§ 5: 16 (4th ed., 2014). 
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requirement for a reasonably alternative design, the 
Restatement (Third) rejects the consumer expectations test as 
an independent standard to determine whether a product is 
defective in design.55   
The Restatement (Third) has been roughly criticized by 
many commenters with most of the concern placed on the 
reasonable alternative design requirement.56 Commenters 
state that this requirement imposes an undue burden, as it 
creates a “potentially insurmountable stumbling block in the 
way of those injured by badly designed products.”57 
Nonetheless, advocates of the Restatement (Third) have a 
convincing case. Proponents argue that the Restatement 
(Third)’s risk-utility analysis provides the fairest test for 
competing interests by ensuring that injured plaintiffs are 
compensated and manufacturers are protected from frivolous 
claims.58 For reasons including, but not limited to, the one 
above the Restatement (Third) has received varying 
commentary from products liability critics.  
 
III. COMBINING THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST AND 
RISK-UTILITY ANALYSES  
 
Substantial differences between the Restatement 
(Second)’s consumer expectations test and the risk-utility 
analyses, including that endorsed by the Restatement (Third), 
have established a rivalry between these two tests. 
Previously, courts determined design defects by exclusively 
                                                 
 
 
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2.  
56 Owen & Davis, supra note 54, at § 5: 16. 
57 Id; Perkins, supra note 45, at 614.  
58 Owen & Davis, supra note 54, at § 5: 16. 
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using one test and refusing to recognize the validity of the 
other.59 However, because of the Restatement (Second)’s 
consumer expectations test’s vagueness and exorbitant 
language, modern courts have adopted principles from the 
risk-utility analyses.60 Specifically, courts have begun to 
apply both tests together by (1) defining one test in the terms 
of the other, and/or (2) establishing each test as a liability 
prong.61  
 
A. SWAPPING TERMS   
 
Quite early in the modern development of American 
products liability law, a large amount of courts began to 
combine terms from both the consumer expectations test and 
risk-utility analyses to determine a product defect.62 The first 
case to adopt this rationale was Seattle-First National Bank v. 
Tabert.63 In Tabert, the Supreme Court of Washington defined 
design defect liability in terms of an “ordinary consumer’s 
reasonable safety expectations.”64 Specifically stating that an 
ordinary consumer “evaluates a product in terms of safety, 
recognizing that virtually no product is or can be made 
absolutely safe.”65 As a result, the Court combined the terms 
of the two tests by holding that the reasonable expectations of 
                                                 
 
 
59 1 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products Liability, 
§ 8: 14 (4th ed., 2014). 
60 See 1 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products 
Liability, § 8: 15 (4th ed., 2014).  
61 Owen & Davis, supra note 59, at § 8: 14. 
62 Id.  
63 Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).  
64 Id.at 779.   
65 Id.  
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a consumer included the cost and feasibility of avoiding 
risk.66 Since Tabert, other courts have followed this approach, 
shifting the standard of liability from a consumer 
expectations model to a cost/benefit analysis.67  
 
B. THE TWO-PRONGS OF LIABILITY  
 
Courts have also recently embraced a two-prong 
approach to determine whether a product is defective in 
design.68 This approach holds a manufacturer liable by 
recognizing either of the two tests – the consumer 
expectations test or a risk-utility analysis.69 For example, in 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,70 the plaintiff alleged a product 
design defect for a Lull Engineering Co. high lift loader.71 The 
California Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision 
in favor of the plaintiff stating that the trial court erred in 
design defect instructions.72 Specifically, the Court held: 
  
[A] trial judge may properly instruct the jury 
that a product is defective in design (1) if the 
plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to 
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect when used in an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the 
                                                 
 
 
66 Id.                 
67 See Owen & Davis, supra note 60, at § 8: 15. 
68 1 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products Liability, 
§ 8: 16 (4th ed., 2014).  
69 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
70 Id. at 419.  
71 Id.   
72 Id.   
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plaintiff proves that the products design 
proximately caused his injury and the 
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant 
factors, . . . that on balance the benefits of the 
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger 
inherent in such design.73 
 
 The Court also listed supplementary factors relevant to 
the risk-utility prong of this test such as the financial costs of 
the alternative design, adverse consequences to the product, 
and feasibility of the alternative design.74  
 With the exception of Barker’s shift in burden, many 
courts have explicitly accepted this two-prong definition of a 
design defect.75 For example, the state of Washington opted 
in a similar statute which separately provides that “a product 
design may be considered defective on a finding of the cost-
effectiveness of a feasible alternative design and for violating 
                                                 
 
 
73 Owen & Davis, supra note 68, at § 8: 16. 
74 Id.   
75 See HOLLIDAY, supra 42 note §28:98; see also Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety 
Systems, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (Ariz. 2011) (“the consumer 
expectation test applies to claims that seatbelts were defectively designed 
in that they failed to restrain belted passengers”); Mikolajczyk v. Ford 
Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 360 (Ill. 2008)(“both the consumer-expectation 
test and the risk-utility test may be utilized in a strict liability design 
defect case to prove that the product is ‘unreasonably 
dangerous’”); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So. 2d 467, 476 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2007) (Warner, J., concurring) (Typical jury instructions define 
design defect in terms of the consumer expectations test or, alternatively, 
a risk-utility analysis). 
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the safety contemplations of an ordinary consumer.”76 
Therefore, by combining the benefits of both tests for a 
standard of liability, a two-prong system seems to have been 
the solution to many states’ search for the ideal test.77  
 
C. COMPLEX VS. SIMPLE DESIGNS  
 
Modern courts’ usage of the consumer expectations 
test and risk-utility analyses vary depending on a product’s 
complexity. For example, some courts limit the consumer 
expectations prong in areas where consumers have 
meaningful expectations of product safety.78 In Soule v. 
General Motors Corp.,79 the California Supreme Court 
concluded that in situations where simple products are of 
concern, the consumer expectations test is appropriate, and in 
situations where accidents involve complex risk tradeoffs that 
require an expert explanation, risk-utility analyses should be 
used exclusively.80 The Court reasoned that “a complex 
product, even when it is being used as intended, may often 
cause injury in a way that does not engage its ordinary 
consumer’s reasonable minimum assumptions about safe 
performance.”81  
                                                 
 
 
76 Owen, supra note 68, at § 8: 16. However, Washington’s statute deviates 
from Barker as it lacks language stating that the consumer expectations test 
and risk-utility analysis can be read mutually exclusive from each other. 
77 Id.  
781 David G. Owens & Mary J. Davis, Owen & Davis on Products Liability, 
§ 8: 17 (4th ed., 2014). 
79 Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cali. 1994).  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 308 (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 443). 
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While many courts adopted Soule’s approach to 
determine the use of the consumer expectations test and risk-
utility analyses, some modern courts opted to use risk-utility 
analyses for both complex and simple product designs.82 This 
is because Soule’s most prominent flaw is its allocation of the 
consumer expectations test to simple risk cases, which almost 
always comprise of obvious design dangers.83 Obvious 
dangers are typically expected by the consumer; therefore, in 
these situations, the risk of injury almost always shifts to the 
consumer no matter how probable the likely danger or how 
easy and inexpensive the means of avoiding it.84 This was 
ultimately the conclusion in Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., in 
which the Illinois Supreme Court adopted an integrated test, 
making both the consumer expectations test and the risk-
utility analyses a product liability standard that can be 
decided upon by the plaintiff and the defendant.85 Rejecting 
the Restatement (Third) but adopting a broadly inclusive risk-
utility analysis in which the consumer test is included, the 
Court emphasized the use of this integrated test for both 
simple and complex issues.86  
Some courts ventured further in the unitary use of risk-
analyses by using a multi-faceted approach to distinguish 
liability between complex and simple designs.87 In Potter v. 
                                                 
 
 
82 Owen & Davis, supra note 78, at § 8: 17; see e.g. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai 
Corpo, 864 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 2007); Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 
800 (Tenn. 2001).  
83 Owen & Davis, supra note 78, at § 8: 17. 
84 Id.    
85 Mikolajczyk., 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008). 
86 Id.  
87 Owen & Davis, supra note 78, at § 8: 17. 
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Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co,88 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
concluded that an “ordinary” consumer expectations test 
applies when determining design defects for limited simple 
designs.89 However, cases involving complex designs would 
be subject to a “modified” consumer expectations test, in 
which the product’s risk and utility would be established and 
the “inquiry would then be whether a reasonable person 
would consider the product design unreasonably 
dangerous.”90 
Following Potter’s approach, courts also noted that 
when an “ordinary” consumer expectations test fails to 
provide a rational basis for recovery, a risk-utility analysis is 
appropriate.91 For example, in Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co.,92 the Connecticut Supreme Court reaffirmed Potter’s dual 
definition of design by holding that “the ordinary consumer 
expectations test is reserved for cases in which the product 
failed to meet the ordinary consumer's minimum safety 
expectations, such as res ipsa loquitur type cases.”93 Therefore, 
some modern courts, like the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
have implemented the rationale in Potter by redefining the 
terms based on the complexity of the product’s design in 
question.  
 
IV. REJECTING THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’S RISK-UTILITY 
ANALYSIS: FLORIDA AND NEVADA  
 
                                                 
 
 
88 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). 
89 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1319. 
90 Id.  at 1333; Owen & Davis, supra note 60, at § 8: 15. 
91 Id. 
92 Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 A.3d 1232 (Conn. 2016).  
93 Id.  
2019 RESURRECTION OF CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST 543 
A. FLORIDA  
 
In Aubin, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the consumer 
expectations test as the sole test to determine a product design 
defect and rejected the use of risk-utility analyses, contrary to 
modern approaches.94 In reaching this decision, the Court 
considered Florida precedent, the Third District Court’s use 
of the Restatement (Third), and supplemental state supreme 
courts’ decisions regarding products liability law.95  
 
i. Florida Precedent 
 
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision revolved 
around the landmark case, West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.96 
West concerned an alleged product design defect found in a 
tractor manufactured by the defendant, Caterpillar Tractor 
Co.97 The Court unanimously followed the Restatement 
(Second), concluding that the defendant was liable based on 
a strict liability theory for these reasons: (1) the public has a 
right to expect that sellers will stand by their products; (2) the 
burden of injuries should be imposed on those who place 
their products on the market; and (3) manufacturers 
implicitly represent the safety of their products once they are 
placed on the market.98 
The Florida Supreme Court went on to state, “since our 
adoption of the consumer expectations test, we have rejected 
                                                 
 
 
94 See Aubin, 177 So.3d at 493-10. 
95 Id.   
96 Id; 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976) 
97 Id. at 82. 
98 Aubin, 177 So.3d at 510.  
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applying legal principles that are inconsistent with the 
general philosophy espoused by this Court in West.”99 One 
case the Court used to reinforce this past behavior was Ford 
Motor Co. v. Hill.100 In Hill, the plaintiff claimed that there was 
a lack of vehicle crashworthiness due to a design defect 
implicated by the defendant.101 In response, the defendant 
requested the use of a risk-utility analysis, stating that the 
product involved complex engineering issues.102 The Court 
denied the defendant’s request, concluding that the consumer 
expectations test is the appropriate standard to apply to all 
manufactured products.103  
In its analysis, the Florida Supreme Court also cited 
Florida precedents104 to argue that  strict liability has been 
used in design defect claims for decades.105 Specifically, the 
Court introduced McConnell v. Union Carbide Corp.,106 which 
involved the same product and defendant as that found in 
Aubin. In this case, the Court reversed the trial court’s 
decision and upheld the use of the consumer expectations 
test.107 The Florida Supreme Court thus introduced precedent 
                                                 
 
 
99 Id. at 503(citing Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So.2d 1167, 1167 
(Fla. 1979)).   
100 Id; 381 So.2d 249, 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).   
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Hill, 381 So.2d at 251.  
104 See, e.g., Samuel Friedland Family Enter v. Amoroso, 630 So.2d 1067, 1071 
(Fla.1994); Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); 
Visnoski v. J.C. Penney Co., 477 So.2d 29, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Liggett 
Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So.2d 467, 473-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Cintron v. 
Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).  
105 See Aubin, 177 So.3d at 504.  
106 937 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  
107 Id.  
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in line with West to establish the validity of the consumer 
expectations test.108   
 
ii. Third District Court’s Adoption of the 
Restatement Third 
 
The Florida Supreme Court also claimed that the 
district court recognized that Florida precedent109 adopted 
the consumer expectations test but chose to apply the 
Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis pursuant to its own 
precedent — Kohler Co. v. Marcottee110 and Agrofollajes, S.A. v. 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.111 In these two cases, the District 
Courts adopted section two of the Restatement (Third) when 
it employed a risk-utility analysis as the legal standard for a 
design defect claim.112 In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court, 
in Aubin, argued that the Restatement (Third) introduces 
principles of negligence by (1) requiring proof of a reasonable 
alternative design and (2) introducing foreseeability of risk to 
the manufacturer as part of the calculus for a design defect.113 
As a result, the Court concluded that the district courts’ 
decision to depart from West, through the adoption of the 
                                                 
 
 
108 See Aubin, 177 So.3d at 504. 
109 Id. “The Third District recognized that this Court had adopted the 
consumer expectations test set forth in section 402A of the Second 
Restatement in West and that the Fourth District McConnell applied the 
consumer expectations test in a case involving the same product.”  
110 907 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). 
111 48 So.3d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).  
112 See Aubin, 177 So.3d at 505. 
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Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis, was 
inappropriate.114  
 
iii. Comparisons of State Supreme Court’s 
Decisions 
 
In determining whether to adopt the Restatement 
(Third)’s risk-utility analysis, the Florida Supreme Court 
considered other state supreme court’s decisions; specifically, 
those that were in line with Florida’s jurisprudence.115 Using 
West as the basis for its argument, the Court argued that strict 
product liability law is based on the following policy: “[T]he 
manufacturer, by placing on the market a potentially 
dangerous product for use and consumption and by 
inducement and promotion encouraging the use of these 
products, thereby undertakes a certain and special 
responsibility toward the consuming public who may be 
injured by it.”116 Agreeing with the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, the Court argued that the use of section two of the 
Restatement (Third) would frustrate these policy concerns 
because the burden of compensating injured consumers of 
unreasonably dangerous products would not be placed on the 
manufacturers.117  
Furthermore, the Court agreed with the Supreme 
Court of Kansas’ conclusion – that the “consumer 




115 See e.g. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000); Tincher v. 
Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 335 (Pa. 2014); Green v. Smith & Nephew 
AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751-52 (Wis. 2001); Godoy ex rel. Gramling v. 
E.I. du Ponte de Nemours & CO., 768 N.W. 2d 674, 686 (Wis. 2009).   
116 Aubin, 177 So.3d at 510 (citing West, 336 So.2d at 86).  
117 Id. 
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expectations test rightly focuses on the expectations that a 
manufacturer created.”118 The Florida Supreme Court 
explained that because a manufacturer plays a pivotal role in 
a consumer’s image of a product, the consumer expectations 
test is the proper test to determine whether a product is 
defective in design.119 The Court argued that the Restatement 
(Third)’s risk-utility analysis shifts from this focus as the 
additional burden makes it harder to prove a design defect in 
negligence cases.120 Additionally, the Court argued that the 
consumer expectations test does not favor one party over 
another.121 As an example, the Florida Supreme Court held 
that in cases involving tobacco products, manufactures have 
sought the application of the consumer expectations test over 
a risk-utility analysis.122  
Lastly, the Court argued that the Restatement (Third)’s 
risk-utility analysis is dispensable in products liability law.123 
Agreeing with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that outside the context of the 
Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis, a plaintiff is not 
precluded from showing that a safer design exists, nor is a 
defendant precluded from showing that the product could 
not have been made safer through a reasonable alternative 
design.124 The Florida Supreme Court held that the 
                                                 
 
 
118 Id. at 511. 
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Restatement (Third)’s requirement of a reasonable alternative 
design is different than allowing evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design.125 Therefore, considering state supreme 
courts’ decisions, the Court in Aubin decided to reject risk-
utility analyses by establishing the consumer expectations test 
as the sole test to determine a product design defect.126 
 
B. NEVADA  
 
In Trejo, the Nevada Supreme Court strayed from modern 
product liability approaches by rejecting risk-utility analyses 
and adopting the consumer expectations test as the sole 
standard to determine a design defect.127 In reaching this 
decision, the Court considered prior Nevada product liability 
cases as well as the positives and negatives of the Restatement 
(Third)’s risk-utility analysis.128  
 
i. Nevada Precedent   
The Supreme Court of Nevada began its analysis by 
examining the “long-used” consumer expectations test in its 
own products liability history.129 Commencing at Nevada’s 
first strict products liability case in 1966, the Nevada Supreme 
Court examined Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski.130 
Dolinski involved a product design defect claim for a 
                                                 
 
 
125 Id. at 512 (citing Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 397 (Pa. 2014)).  
126 Id. at 510. 
127 See Trejo, 402 P.3d at 653. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855, 857 (Nev. 
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Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. soda product.131 Affirming 
the jury’s verdict, the Dolinski Court held that manufacturers 
are representing to the public that their products are safe 
solely by placing them on the market.132 
The Nevada Supreme Court went on to establish that 
the policies asserted in Dolinski led to the adoption of the 
consumer expectations test in Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp.133 In 
this case, the Court held that while the definitions of “defect” 
contain different meanings, they all express that defective 
products are those that fail to perform in a manner that is 
reasonably expected from their intended purpose and 
nature.134  
Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that in 
its product liability history, Nevada has always relied on the 
consumer expectations test to determine design defect 
liability.135 In fact, Nevada precedent136 has concluded that an 
alternative design is one factor that can be used for the jury to 
decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous; 
however, said alternative design must still be commercially 
feasible.137 Here, the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in 
Trejo was clearly fashioned from Nevada’s products liability 
precedent.    
 
                                                 
 
 
131 Id.  
132 Trejo, 402 P.3d at 653 (citing Dolinski, 420 P.2d at 857). 
133 Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970).  
134 Id. at 138.  
135 Trejo, 402 P.3d at 653 (citing Krause Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 566, 571-72 (Nev. 
2001)); Robinson v. G.G,C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 524 (Nev. 1991).  
136 See McCourt v. J.C. Penny Co., 734 P.2d 696, 698 (Nev. 1987).  
137 Id. (citing Robinson, 808 P.2d at 525-27).  
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ii. Risk-Utility Analysis vs. Consumer 
Expectations Test 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court considered the 
advantages of risk-utility analyses to determine whether to 
adopt the Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis over the 
consumer expectations test. First, the Court noted that 
numerous States have exclusively adopted risk-utility 
analyses either in state statutes or in design defect cases,138 
while other state courts have adopted a hybrid approach, 
using risk-utility analyses only in cases concerning 
complicated and technical product designs.139 Courts 
adopting the later, argue that “. . . consumer[s] d[o] not have 
ascertainable ‘expectations’ about the performance of a 
complex product” and thus the use of a risk-utility analysis 
provides objective factors that can be analyzed by a jury.140  
Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded 
that the proposed benefits of risk-utility analyses are 
exaggerated.141 The Court reasoned that a lay jury is 
sufficiently able to determine whether a complex product 
performs in a reasonable manner using the consumer 
                                                 
 
 
138 Id. (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jernigan, 883 So.2d 646, 662 (Ala. 2003); 
Banks v. JCI Americas Inc., 264 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994); Wright v. 
Brooke Grp. Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002); Toyota Motor Corp. v. 
Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004); Jenkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 945 So.2d 
144, 150-51 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Williams v. Bennett, 921 So.2d 1269, 1273 
(Miss. 2006); Rix v. Gen Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986); 
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex. 1998).  
139 Id. (citing Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (1994); Mikolajczyk 
v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 347 (2008)).   
140 Id. (citing Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1700, 1716 (2003); Branham, 390 701 S.E.2d at 5 (2010)).  
141 Id. at 655. 
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expectations test.142 Emphasizing the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s reasoning, the Nevada Supreme Court articulated:  
 
A determination of “unreasonable danger,” like 
a determination that a product is in a condition 
not contemplated by the ordinary consumer, 
does not inevitably require any degree of 
scientific understanding about the product 
itself. Rather, it requires understanding of how 
safely the ordinary consumer would expect the 
product to serve its intended purpose. 143 
 
In furthering this concept, the Court stated that in 
regards to scientific or technical evidence, juries are always 
asked to make decisions based on complex facts in different 
types of litigation.144 Thus, the problems presented in 
products liability cases are not more insoluble than similar 
problems found in other areas of strict liability law.145 
The Supreme Court of Nevada also stated that the 
Restatement (Third) presents palpable disadvantages.146 For 
example, the Court held that the Restatement (Third)’s 
reasonable alternative design requirement conflicts with 
Nevada’s public policy because it “blurs the distinction 
between strict products liability claims and negligence 
claims.”147 Citing to Aubin and Green, the Court held that 
unlike the consumer expectations test, which focuses on the 




143 Id. (citing Green 629 N.W.2d at 742).  
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
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reasonable expectations of the consumer, a risk-utility test 
undermines this analysis by concentrating on whether the 
manufacturer considered  the “foreseeable risks of harm” 
when choosing a product design.148  
The Court also noted that the Restatement (Third)’s 
focus on the conduct of the manufacturer “imposes an undue 
burden on plaintiffs that might preclude otherwise valid 
claims from jury consideration.”149 Therefore, the Nevada 
Supreme Court upheld the use of the consumer expectations 
test over risk-utility analyses, after establishing what the 
Court believed to be the Restatement (Third)’s encumbrances. 
   
V. AUBIN AND TREJO: A REGRESSION IN AMERICAN 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY  
 
Aubin and Trejo’s import represents a drastic shift from 
modern product liability laws.150 The Supreme Courts of 
Florida and Nevada’s decisions to hold the consumer 
expectations test as the sole determinative analysis represents 
a regression in American products liability law.151 Following 
the Courts’ rejection of risk-utility analyses, including that 
endorsed by the Restatement (Third), commenters are left 
questioning the validity of the Florida Supreme Court’s and 
the Nevada Supreme Court’s arguments.  
What is clear is the Courts’ decisions to center their 
arguments on precedent; specifically, precedent that employs 
dated public policy implications – that manufacturers 
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implicitly represent the safety of their products by placing 
them on the market and are thus in the best position to protect 
innocent customers against the harm.152 While true, this 
public policy consideration no longer benefits society given 
today’s complex products and technological dependencies.153 
In its place, the Supreme Courts of Florida and Nevada 
should have considered manufacturers’ ability to achieve 
optimal levels of safety when designing products.154 As 
expressed by Henderson and Twerski, “[s]ociety does not 
benefit from products that are excessively safe – for example, 
automobiles designed with maximum speeds for 20 miles per 
hour – any more than it benefits from products that are too 
risky.”155 Thus, society benefits most when the proper 
amount of product safety is reached.156  
Taking into consideration this appropriate public 
policy, the consumer expectations test, alone, is unfit. 
Notably, this test implicates manufacturers for a product 
defect without the deliberation of factors that might expound 
a manufacturer’s decision to utilize a particular design.157 In 
contrast, risk-utility analyses, including that recognized by 
the Restatement (Third), impose liability contingent upon a 
cost/benefit analysis, which not only allows for the 
deliberation of factors regarding a manufacturer’s choice in 
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design, but also promotes technological growth by reducing 
fear of impending litigation.158  
The second argument employed by the Florida 
Supreme Court and the Nevada Supreme Court – that the 
Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis places an undue 
burden on plaintiffs, which precludes otherwise valid claims 
from jury consideration – is also easily rebuttable. From an 
evidentiary perspective, a plaintiff’s introduction of a safer 
alternative design would present a more compelling case than 
one without said proof.159 There are numerous examples 
where the Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility analysis achieved 
a verdict for the plaintiff.160 For example, as ironically 
mentioned by the Florida Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in 
Kohler retained a favorable verdict with the use of this design 
defect standard.161 
Following the argument above, the Restatement 
(Third)’s risk-utility analysis is not cumbersome because a 
plaintiff is not required to produce a prototype of an 
alternatively designed product, but can use expert testimony 
to show a reasonable alternative design.162 A plaintiff is also 
allowed to show other products already available on the 
market that may serve a similar function at a comparable risk 
and cost.163 Moreover, when looking at the Restatement 
(Third) as a whole, sections three and four lessen the need for 
                                                 
 
 
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2  
159 See Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Restatement 
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a reasonable alternative design.164 For example, a plaintiff is 
excused from having to establish a reasonable alternative 
design when a defect may be inferred through res ipsa loquitur 
(section three), and when a product fails to comply with a 
governmental regulation or statute (section four).165 Lastly, 
comment e leaves open the possibility that the Restatement 
(Third) allows a plaintiff to bypass the requirement of a 
reasonable alternative design when a court concludes that a 
product is unreasonably dangerous because “the danger 
posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs 
its negligible social utility.”166 Upon reflection of the state 
supreme courts’ argument, it is noticeable that the Courts are 
focused solely on section two rather than the Restatement 
(Third) as a whole.167 In fact, the Florida Supreme Court and 
the Nevada Supreme Court refer to other supreme courts168 
that decline to accept the Restatement (Third) precisely 
because of this fragmented interpretation.169  
Ultimately, the Courts could have reached a middle 
ground by adopting a hybrid tactic that endorses a risk-utility 
                                                 
 
 
164 Id.  
165 Id. at § 4 
166 Id. at § 4 rep. note cmt. b.; see e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 
1322, 1326-27 (Or. 1978); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184-85 
(Colo. 1992); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674-75 (Ga. 1994); 
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Minn. 1987).  
167 Aubin, 177 So.3d at 511; Trejo, 420 P.3d at 652. 
168 Aubin, 177 So.3d at 511 (Referencing the Kansas Supreme Court, 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and Wisconsin Supreme Court.); Trejo, 420 
P.3d at 652 (Referencing the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Georgia Supreme 
Court, Alaska Supreme Court, Iowa Supreme Court, Kentucky Supreme 
Court, Missouri Supreme Court, and Montana Supreme Court). 
169 See Aubin, 177 So.3d at 511; Trejo, 420 P.3d at 652.  
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analysis with the burden placed on the manufacturer.170 Case 
in point, the Supreme Courts of Florida and Nevada could 
have implemented the Barker approach, which allows a 
plaintiff to demonstrate that a product is defective through (1) 
the consumer expectations test or (2) by establishing that the 
product design proximately caused his injury and the 
defendant, through a risk-utility analysis, failed to prove 
otherwise.171 Given this available standard, the state supreme 
courts’ decision to reject risk-utility analyses due to a 
plaintiff’s “heightened burden” is immaterial. 
The Florida Supreme Court and the Nevada Supreme 
Court made additional unjustified arguments concerning the 
benefits of the consumer expectations test.172 For example, the 
Florida Supreme Court argued that the consumer 
expectations test is fair to both parties, as both the plaintiff 
and the defendant can introduce evidence.173 While this may 
be true, the consumer expectations test still lacks impartiality. 
By focusing on the product itself, the consumer expectations 
test makes it substantially easier for a plaintiff to recover, 
regardless of whether a manufacturer exercised utmost 
care.174 Thus, a risk-utility analysis is the fairest standard for 
determining a design defect as competing interests are 
weighed upon consideration of numerous factors, including 
but not limited to, a reasonable alternative design.175  
The Florida Supreme Court also claimed that because 
a manufacturer plays a pivotal role in a consumer’s image of 
                                                 
 
 
170 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 443.  
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172 Aubin, 177 So.3d at 511; Trejo, 420 P.3d at 652. 
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174 Perkins, supra note 45, at 614. 
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a product, the consumer expectations test is the proper test to 
determine whether a product is defective in design.176 While 
the consumer expectations test does encapsulate consumer 
expectations, so too does a risk-utility analysis.177 In fact, 
under risk-utility analyses, including that recognized by the 
Restatement (Third), consumer expectations are not only 
relevant but “may still substantially influence or even be 
ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing.”178   
The Florida Supreme Court could have also imposed a 
hybrid approach that would have retained the Court’s 
“proper test” argument while simultaneously implementing 
a risk-utility analysis.179 This multifunctional test, referred to 
as the Tabert approach, combines both tests by allowing an 
ordinary consumer to evaluate a product in terms of its safety 
given numerous factors.180 Thus, the Tabert approach hinders 
the Florida Supreme Court’s argument that a consumer 
expectations test is a better fit to determine a product design 
defect.  
The Nevada’s Supreme Court’s decision to reject a 
hybrid approach because a jury can sufficiently determine 
whether a complex product performs in a reasonable manner 
is irrelevant. The flaw in the Restatement (Second)’s 
consumer expectations test is not that it relies on the ordinary 
consumer’s point of view, but rather that it treats such 
expectations regarding a manufacturers responsibility as a 
“ceiling” rather than a “floor.”181 For example, a jury 
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determining liability for a design defect based solely on the 
consumer expectations test may reach the extreme conclusion 
that the plaintiff, having suffered injuries, should recover 
without showing any further evidence.182 On the other 
extreme, a jury may conclude that because the product 
matches the intended design, the plaintiff should be barred 
from recovery.183 Therefore, as the majority stated in Barker, 
“the expectations of the ordinary consumer cannot be viewed 
as the exclusive yardstick for evaluating a design defect 
because ‘[i]n many situations . . . the consumer would not 
know what to expect, because he would have no idea how 
safe the product could be made.’”184  
Nevertheless, even if the Supreme Court of Nevada’s 
aforementioned argument is presumed true, the Court could 
have approached liability of simple and complex design 
defects by using the Potter approach.185 Accordingly, the 
Court could have facilitated an “ordinary” consumer 
expectations test for limited simple design cases and a 
“modern” consumer expectations tests, which employs a risk-
utility analysis, for complex cases.186 This approach adopts 
the consumer expectations test as the predominant standard 
to determine design defects, while simultaneously 
implementing a preventative measure for extreme 
outcomes.187 Thus, there are various modern approaches that 
the Courts’ could have followed that would have rendered 
most of their arguments obsolete.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
 
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Aubin and the 
Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Trejo exemplify two 
state supreme courts’ decisions to deviate from current 
products liability approaches by rejecting the use of risk-
utility analyses, including that endorsed by the Restatement 
(Third), to determine a design defect.188 Most modern courts 
have adopted some form of risk-utility analysis either 
following Tabert’s combination of terms methodology, 
Barker’s two-prongs of liability approach, or Soule’s, 
Mikolajczyk, Potter, and Izzarelli’s simple vs. complex design 
system.189 
Nevertheless, in both Aubin and Trejo the Courts 
expressed rebuttable reasons for their decisions to deviate 
from modern trends. Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court 
relied on precedent,190 Florida public policy, the Third’s 
District Court’s “inappropriate” use of precedent,191 and 
comparable state supreme court decisions192 to reach its 
conclusion.193 Similarly, in its opinion in Trejo, the Nevada 
Supreme Court not only relied on precedent194 to reach its 
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conclusion, but also emphasized the perceived disadvantages 
of adopting the risk-utility analyses to determine a product 
defect.195 By weighing these factors, the Courts improperly 
concluded that the consumer expectations test is the proper 
standard to determine whether a product is defective in 
design, in contrast to risk-utility analyses, including that 
recognized by the Restatement (Third).196  
At length, the state supreme courts’ decisions are 
centered on erred arguments; specifically, the Florida 
Supreme Court’s and the Nevada Supreme Court’s 
arguments concerning precedent and public policy are 
aligned with dated views.197 Likewise, the state supreme 
courts’ arguments – that the Restatement (Third) is unduly 
burdensome, unfair, and unfit – represent the Courts’ 
inability to see the bigger picture and recognize equally 
proper modern approaches such as that endorsed by Tabert.198 
The Nevada Supreme Court’s reference to jury interpretation 
regarding simple and complex product designs also 
establishes this Court’s resistance to suitable modern 
approaches; specifically, the Potter approach.199 For these 
reasons, Aubin and Trejo represent a regression in American 
products liability, reinstating an unequitable test to determine 
a product design defect.    
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